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Abstract
The two sides of envy, destructive and competitive, give rise to qualitatively different equi-
libria, depending on economic, institutional, and cultural environment. If inequality is high,
property rights are poorly protected, and social comparisons are strong, the society is likely
to settle in the “fear equilibrium,” in which better endowed agents restrain their efforts to
prevent destructive envy of the relatively poor. In the opposite case, the standard “keep-
ing up with the Joneses” competition arises, and individuals satisfy their relative standing
concerns through suboptimally high efforts. The different nature of these equilibria leads to
starkingly contrasting effects of envy on economic performance. From welfare perspective,
adoption of better institutions may not be Pareto improving, since positional externality is
curbed in the low-output fear equilibrium. The theory is consistent with broad empirical
facts from social sciences and bridges the gap between separate lines of research on envy.
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1 Introduction
Interpersonal comparisons and concern for relative standing are pervasive features of in-
dividuals interacting in a society. That is why social sciences including anthropology,
sociology, psychology, political science, and economics take these phenomena seriously.
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the results of theoretical and empirical research on
the role of relative standing concerns in driving economic and institutional outcomes. It
develops a theory which captures in a unified framework qualitatively different equilibria
that can emerge in the presence of positional externalities, depending on economic, insti-
tutional and cultural environment. The theory is used to analyze in a novel way a number
of important issues such as the role of redistributive mechanisms in mitigating destructive
activities, the evolution of property rights protection, and inequality dynamics.
Throughout the paper the concern for relative standing is referred to as “envy.” It
is assumed that envy is part of preferences and individuals care about how their own
consumption compares to that of their reference group.1 The fundamental idea, supported
by different strands of research on envy, is that relative concerns can be satisfied in two
important ways: by increasing own outcome (competitive envy) and by decreasing the
outcome of the reference group (destructive envy).2 The active side of envy is determined
by the environment reflected in three main factors: inequality of endowments, level of
property rights protection, and strength of social comparisons. So, envy itself is in the
utility function, and its manifestation is conditioned by the “budget constraint” shaped by
economic, institutional and cultural factors.
The basic model is set up as a simple two-person (two-group) dynamic game consisting
of two stages. In the first stage, each individual invests, and the outcome depends on
effort and endowment. In the second stage, this investment outcome is used in production.
Moreover, the initially disadvantaged agent may choose to spend part of his time to improve
his relative position by disrupting the other agent’s production process. Whether he chooses
1A number of evolutionary theoretic explanations have been proposed for why people have relative
concerns in their preferences, recently by Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2007); see Hopkins
(2008, section 3) and Robson and Samuelson (2011, section 4.2) for an overview. Evidence in support for
relative concerns is abundant and comes from empirical happiness research (Luttmer, 2005), experimental
economics (Zizzo, 2003), neuroscience (Fliessbach et al., 2007), and surveys (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005);
see Clark et al. (2008, section 3) and Frank and Heffetz (2011, section 3) for an overview.
2An alternative option is to give up and drop out from the competition for status (Banerjee, 1990;
Barnett et al., 2010). Yet another possibility is to redefine the reference group (see Falk and Knell (2004)
for a model with endogenous formation of reference standards).
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to do so depends on the inequality of investment outcomes and tolerance for inequality,
which is determined endogenously by the level of property rights protection (effectiveness
of destruction technology) and the importance of relative concerns.3 The better endowed
individual anticipates the possibility of destructive envy and can prevent it by trading off
output for leisure in the investment stage.
This game gives rise to different types of equilibria, with either competitive or destruc-
tive side of envy active. The first one is a familiar “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ)
equilibrium, in which individuals compete with each other peacefully and consumption ex-
ternality leads to suboptimally high output at a cost of reducing leisure. The second type is
the “fear equilibrium,” in which the better endowed individual anticipates destructive envy
and prevents it by restricting effort in the investment stage. In this equilibrium the rich
individual is at the corner solution and factors that aggravate the “fear constraint” lead
to lower economic outcomes. Finally, if the initial inequality is very high or the tolerance
for inequality is low, that is, property rights are poorly protected and relative concerns are
strong, a destructive equilibrium arises, in which actual destruction takes place and part
of the output is wasted to satisfy envy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature
and evidence motivating the need for a unified economic theory of envy. Section 3 lays
out the basic model and examines its comparative statics. In Section 4 the theory is
modified to allow voluntary transfers, and redistributive mechanisms are shown to prevent
destruction in equilibrium. In Section 5 the basic model is used to analyze the incentives
of envious agents to adopt better property rights protection that would eliminate the
fear of destructive envy. It is shown that a positive institutional change may fail since
individuals might prefer to “live in fear” rather than compete in a “rat race” for status.
Section 6 extends the basic model to a dynamic framework by endogenizing the evolution of
inequality. This extension allows to analyze transitions between different types of equilibria,
as well as convergence to the long-run steady state. It also highlights the factors that can
keep societies in the fear of envy trap or help them to get out of it. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are collected in Appendix.
3See Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) for a pioneering discussion of the factors affecting tolerance for
inequality and of the “tunnel effect” as a force countervailing envy.
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2 Related Literature and Evidence
Envy and its effects on people’s incentives have been the subject of attention since ancient
times. The distinction between the two sides of envy, destructive and competitive, goes
back at least to Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” (see Schoeck, 1969, p. 194).4 Classical economists
like Adam Smith and Richard Whately considered emulation to be a powerful engine
of economic development.5 Whately in his “Introductory Lectures on Political Economy”
(1831) suggests that “as wealth increased, the continued stimulus of emulation would make
each man strive to surpass, or at least not fall below his neighbors” (quoted in Kern, 2001,
p. 355) and goes on to describe the mechanics of the KUJ competition. At the same time,
Smith in “The Wealth of Nations” (1776) warns about the destructive side of envy and sees
it as one of the reasons for the necessity of government’s protection of private property:
“The aﬄuence of the few supposes the indigence of many, who are often both driven by
want, and prompted by envy, to invade their possessions. It is only under the shelter of
the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property. . . can sleep a single night in
security” (quoted in Schoeck, 1969, p. 200).
This dichotomy has been discussed extensively by sociologists (Schoeck, 1969; Clanton,
2006), anthropologists (Foster, 1972), philosophers (D’Arms and Kerr, 2008), political
scientists (Ferna´ndez de la Mora, 1987), psychologists (Smith and Kim, 2007; van de Ven
et al., 2009), theologists (Malina, 2001, chapter 4) and economists (Elster, 1991; Zizzo,
2008). The terms that roughly correspond to the two sides of envy and are used by
researchers in different contexts are: 1) destructive envy, black envy, envy proper, malicious
envy, schadenfreude, resentment; 2) competitive envy, white envy, benign envy, emulation,
keeping up with the Joneses. The connotation is negative for the first group and mostly
positive for the second. In the economic theory of envy, proposed in this paper, the motive,
concern for relative standing, is always the same, but, depending on the environment, its
active side may be either destructive or competitive.
Despite the general consensus about the two sides, or behavioral consequences, of envy,
most in-depth research has concentrated on its one particular aspect. The fear of envy,
caused by its destructive potential, is examined in the works by anthropologists studying
small-scale societies. Foster (1972) distinguishes between competitive and fear “axes” of
envy focusing on the latter, along which a man “fears being envied for what he has, and
4For an overview of philosophical texts on envy see Schoeck (1969, chapter 11) and Ferna´ndez de la
Mora (1987, part A). A recent philosophical examination of inequality and envy is by Ben-Ze’ev (1992).
5The treatment of relative standing concerns by classical economists is examined by Kern (2001).
3
wishes to protect himself from the consequences of the envy of others” (p. 166). He argues
that the fear axis is predominant in peasant societies and links it to the model of cognitive
orientation that he labeled the “Image of Limited Good.”. In such societies “life is played as
a zero-sum game, in which one player’s advantage is at the expense of the other” (Foster,
1972, p. 168). Consequently, people are reluctant to exert effort or innovate since they
expect sanctions such as forced redistribution, plain destruction, or casting the evil eye.
The evil eye belief is one of the interesting cultural phenomena associated with the fear
of envy. According to the general view, it is the belief that people can project harm by
looking at others or their property. Most theories about the nature of the evil eye belief
link it to the fear of envy (Maloney, 1976). Furthermore, Aquaro (2004) defines it as a
belief “that a person’s eye produces harmful emanations when he or she feels envy towards
another.” The term “institutionalized envy” coined by Wolf (1955) summarizes the set of
cultural control mechanisms related to the fear axis of envy which includes, apart from the
evil eye belief, gossip, fear, and practice of witchcraft. According to Wolf, such mechanisms
minimize “disruptive phenomena such as economic mobility, abuse of ascribed power, or
individual conspicuous show of wealth” (p. 460).
Institutionalized envy can have important effects on economic incentives. Platteau
(2000, chapter 5) analyzes the role of witchcraft as a deterrent to private accumulation of
wealth in African rural societies. Schoeck (1969, chapter 5) cites other examples of how
institutionalized envy restrains innovation and economic progress. A typical one is that of
a peasant in an Indian village who refused to use a new fertilizer motivating it by the fear
of the evil eye in case of especially good harvest. Schoeck generalizes this phenomenon
and calls it the “envy-barrier” of developing countries, pointing out that this aspect of
envy is often ignored: “The social sciences have put forward numerous theories on the
assumption that the normal man seeks a maximum in production and in property. . . These
theories, however, overlook the fact that in great many situations the object of human
activity is diminution; that regularly recurring modes of human behaviour have as their
object the lessening of assets, not just their replacement by other assets” (p. 59). This
point is accounted for in the proposed theory of envy. In the formal model of Section 3
the fear of envy is neither ungrounded nor tied to supernatural sanctions: in equilibria
reflecting the destructive side of envy actual destruction represents a credible threat.
Destructive or fear manifestations of envy are characteristic not only for simple pre-
industrial societies. Mui (1995) focuses on two large industrial economies, Soviet Union
and China, in the beginning of their transition to the free market. He brings up evidence on
emerging cooperative restaurants and shops in the Soviet Union being regularly attacked
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by people resenting their success. He then cites (p. 313) a similar story from Chinese
press about a peasant whose successful entrepreneurship provoked the envious neighbors
to steal timber for his new house and kill his farm animals. “I dare not work too hard to
get rich again” was his comment. The fear of destructive envy may be a serious issue in
societies with socialist experience for two reasons. One is the ideology of leveling, which,
contrary to the intentions of policymakers, may intensify invidious comparisons and lower
tolerance for inequality. The second reason is the neglect of private property rights that
makes destructive envy more likely.
In the proposed theory the fear of destructive envy is a deterrent to effort. However,
restricting own outcomes is not the only way to reduce envy. One of the obvious methods of
envy-avoidance is hiding assets from the sight of the envious or diminishing their value. In
Ghana, a rich man reduces his relatives’ envy by leaving unfinished a house he was building
(Schoeck, 1969). In Bolivia, people of the Siriono tribe eat alone at night to avoid envious
looks of the others (Holmberg, 1985). In a Mexican village, the fear of envy underlies the
refusal to install glass windows in houses (Foster, 1979). In an Egyptian village, livestock
is kept hidden in the recesses of the house to keep it from the evil eye (Ghosh, 1983). These
are examples of how the fear of envy leads to productivity loss.
Taking all this evidence together, one could distinguish the salient features of an equi-
librium showing the destructive side of envy. On the economic side: little or no innovation,
low productivity and social mobility, envy-avoidance behavior. On the cultural side: ubiq-
uitous fear of envy, “institutionalized envy.” On the institutional side: poor protection of
private property rights, redistributive mechanisms.
A very different equilibrium arises if the competitive side of envy is active. This is
the well-known “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) competition. In this case the rela-
tive standing concern is satisfied by exerting additional effort and investing in productive
rather than destructive activities, which has very different implications of envy for economic
performance. As demonstrated by Frank (1985), positional externality leads to overcon-
sumption of positional good (consumption) versus nonpositional good (leisure) compared
to cooperatively determined demands. Schor documents these phenomena for the mod-
ern U.S. society in “The Overspent American” (1998) and “The Overworked American”
(1992), respectively.
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) study the employment decisions of women using data
from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and find evidence that labor supply
is partly driven by relative income concerns. Bowles and Park (2005) use data on ten Euro-
pean OECD countries over the period 1963–1998 to show that greater earnings inequality
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is associated with longer work hours. They argue that the underlying cause is the Veblen
effect of the consumption of the rich on the less wealthy, that is, emulation. Recognizing
the effect of positional concerns on effort, Frank (2007) also warns about the potential
adverse effects of competitive envy on savings and human capital investment and argues
for introducing a progressive consumption tax to correct consumption externality.
The “hedonic treadmill,” characteristic of the KUJ-type competition, has been the
subject of recent papers in the field of happiness economics. Social comparison is one of the
keys to understanding why happiness and material well-being may not always go together.
Section 5 conducts the comparative welfare analysis of the KUJ and fear equilibria to
address this issue.
To summarize, here are the salient features of an equilibrium with competitive envy.
On the economic side: high productivity and mobility, consumer society. On the cultural
side: emulation, KUJ, no fear of envy. On the institutional side: well-protected private
property rights.
When is each of the described equilibria more likely to arise? As shown in the formal
model of the next section, the type of equilibrium is determined jointly by a set of economic,
institutional and cultural factors summarized by inequality of endowments, protection of
property rights, and strength of positional concerns.
The two papers most directly related to this work are Mui (1995) and Mitsopoulos
(2009). Mui (1995) constructs a model that captures an equilibrium in which innovations
are not adopted because of expected envious retaliation. The essence of the fear equilibrium
in the present theory is similar. However, Mui’s setup ignores the competitive component
of relative standing concerns and thus, does not account for the positional externality that
is being curbed in the fear equilibrium. This leads to alternative welfare implications of
improving institutional quality. In Mitsopoulos (2009) individuals who care about relative
savings decide on the allocation of effort between productive and destructive activities.
However, the static nature of the stage game and assumptions made on technologies do
not allow to capture the qualitatively different equilibria associated with the two sides of
envy, which is crucial for understanding the evidence presented above.
Finally, this paper is related to the strand of literature on conflict, appropriation,
and the emergence of property rights.6 The focus is, however, on envy as the sole cause
of conflict (Sections 3 and 4) and the role that positional externalities may play in the
decision to adopt better property rights protection (Section 5).
6See, e.g., Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim (1995), Muthoo (2004).
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3 The Basic Model
Environment. Consider two agents that may be thought of as representatives of equal-
sized homogeneous groups of people. They differ only in the amount of broadly defined
initial endowments, Ki, i = 1, 2. In particular,
K1 = λK, K2 = (1− λ)K, (1)
where K is the total endowment in the economy and parameter 0 < λ < 1/2 captures the
degree of initial inequality: Agent 1 is “poor” and Agent 2 is “rich.” They interact in the
following two-stage game (see Figure 1).
In both stages each agent has a unit of time. In the first stage, time is spent on
investment, say, education or innovation. Each agent exerts effort, Li > 0, to produce an
outcome, Yi, according to the following investment function:
Yi = F (Ki, Li) = KiLi, i = 1, 2. (2)
This outcome may be thought of as a factor of production like human or physical capital,
or potential output, to be realized in the second stage.
Unequal outcomes of the investment stage may lead to destructive envy on part of the
poor agent in the second stage. Following Grossman and Kim (1996), assume that there
is a “predator and prey” type of relationship between Agent 1 and Agent 2, such that the
initially disadvantaged agent can engage in destruction after observing the outcomes of the
first stage.7 As will become clear, Agent 1 may choose to do that purely out of envy, if the
level of inequality is high enough.
In the second stage, while the rich agent spends all the time on realization of potential
output, the poor splits his time between destruction and production. The destruction
technology is as follows. If Agent 1 allocates a fraction d ∈ [0, 1] of his time to disrupt the
productive activity of Agent 2, the latter retains only a fraction p of Y2, where
p(d) =
1
1 + τd
· (3)
As will become clear, the formulation with time allocation makes the model scale-free:
optimal destruction intensity will be a function of posterior inequality (but not the scale)
7For simplicity, the rich are not allowed to invest in protection. A more general formulation would
also allow for theft with partial destruction, without affecting the qualitative results. The implications of
defense in a model of appropriation have been examined by Grossman and Kim (1995; 1996).
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Effort Li Outcomes Yi
Stage 1 (Investment)
Production/Destruction Consumption Ci Payoffs U
i
Stage 2 (Production, Destruction, Consumption)
Figure 1: Timing of events in the envy game.
of first-stage outcomes, which captures the essence of destructive envy.8 The function p(d)
has plausible properties: it is bounded, with p(0) = 1, decreasing, and convex. Parameter
τ > 0 measures the effectiveness of destruction and represents the overall level of private
property rights protection. In particular, property rights are secure if τ is low.
At the end of stage 2 individuals consume whatever is left after production and de-
struction (if any) take place:
C1 = (1− d)Y1, C2 = p(d)Y2, (4)
and payoffs are generated. The utility function is of the following form:
U i = U(Ci, Cj, Li) = v(Ci − θCj)− e(Li) = (Ci − θCj)
1−σ
1− σ − Li, (5)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, σ > 0 and 0 < θ < 1.9 It is increasing in own consumption
(U1 > 0) and decreasing in the other agent’s consumption (U2 < 0) and own effort (U3 < 0).
Parameter θ captures the strength of concern for relative standing. Agents are each other’s
reference points which is natural in the setup with two individuals. This utility function
incorporates additive comparison which is one of the two most popular ways (the other
being ratio comparison) to model envy.10 Linearity in effort is assumed for analytical
tractability. Overall, the form of the utility function is identical to that in Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000), but in their model the reference point for each agent is the average
consumption in the population.
A crucial property of this utility function is that the cross-partial derivative U12 is
positive, leading to the “keeping up with the Joneses” kind of behavior, or emulation, due to
complementarity between own and reference consumption. This is what Clark and Oswald
8If, apart from time, material resources or extra effort are needed to destroy, the scale effect may arise,
which does not change the qualitative results of the basic model, but undermines analytical tractability.
9Assume for simplicity that U i = −∞ whenever Ci 6 θCj . Since effort is unbounded, this will never
be the relevant case in equilibrium.
10Additive comparison has been used, among others, by Knell (1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and
Mitsopoulos (2009). For examples of models with ratio comparison see Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and
Carroll et al. (1997). Clark and Oswald (1998) examine the theoretical properties of both formulations.
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(1998) call “comparison-concave” utility (since v′′(Ci − θCj) < 0). Intuitively it means
that individuals are willing to match an increase in consumption of their reference group.
The reason is that an increase in Cj reduces the consumption rank of individual i and,
under concave comparisons, raises the marginal utility of own consumption. Comparison-
concavity also implies that the effect of envy is stronger for the poorer agent.
Finally, the utility function reflects the assumption that consumption is a positional
good, while leisure is not. This hypothesis has been consistently advocated by Frank (1985;
2007) and finds empirical support (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005).
Best responses. The dynamic structure of the model makes subgame perfect equilib-
rium a natural solution concept. The model is solved backwards, starting at stage 2, when
effort is sunk. Given the outcomes of the investment stage, Y1 and Y2, Agent 1 chooses the
intensity of destruction, d, to maximize his payoff:
v((1− d)Y1 − θp(d)Y2) −→ max
d
s.t. 0 6 d 6 1. (6)
This yields the optimal second-stage action11:
d∗ =
 0, if Y1/Y2 > τθ;1
τ
·
(√
τθ Y2
Y1
− 1
)
, if Y1/Y2 < τθ.
(7)
Few things are to be noticed about this expression. First, without envy (θ = 0) there is no
destruction. If envy is present, the decision about engaging in destruction depends on the
level of posterior inequality, Y1/Y2. If Y1 is high enough compared to Y2, Agent 1 finds it
optimal to refrain from destruction. Otherwise, it is optimal to engage in destruction and
its intensity is increasing in inequality, effectiveness of destructive technology and strength
of envy. The threshold τθ is an endogenous measure of tolerance for inequality. Given the
level of posterior inequality, destructive envy is more likely to occur if relative standing
concerns are strong (large θ) and property rights are poorly protected (large τ). Assume
from now on that τθ < 1, which means that there is some tolerance for inequality and no
destruction takes place if Y1 > Y2. The retention rate corresponding to d∗ is
p∗ = p(d∗) =
 1, if Y1/Y2 > τθ;√Y1
Y2
· 1
τθ
, if Y1/Y2 < τθ,
(8)
and, for the case with destruction, it is strictly decreasing in τ , θ, and Y2/Y1.
11Clearly, d∗ = 1 is never optimal in equilibrium. Moreover, the first-stage effort will guarantee that
(1− d∗)Y1 − θp(d∗)Y2 > 0. Hence, only the relevant case 0 6 d∗ < 1 is considered.
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The agents are forward-looking and anticipate second-stage outcomes when making
their first-stage decisions. Although Agent 2 is passive at stage 2, he is perfectly aware of
how his investment outcome will affect d∗ and takes this into account at stage 1:
v(p∗Y2 − θ(1− d∗)Y1)− Y2/K2 −→ max
Y2
(9)
For technical reasons, it is easier to analyze the best responses of both agents in terms
of consumption levels, Ci, rather than first-stage outcomes Yi. Note that these are different
only if destruction actually takes place. In the latter case there is a one-to-one mapping
between Yi and Ci. To guarantee that the best-response functions are always well-defined
the following assumption is maintained about τ throughout the paper: 1 < τ < 1/θ.
Moreover, assume that σ > 1, i.e., the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to relative
consumption, which drives the emulative behavior, is high enough.12
Lemma 1 (BR of Agent 2). The best-response function of Agent 2, BR2 ≡ C∗2(C1),
has the following form:
C∗2(C1) =

K
1/σ
2 + θC1, if C1 > C˜1;
C1 · 1τθ , if Ĉ1 6 C1 < C˜1;
Cd2 (C1), if C1 < Ĉ1,
(10)
where
C˜1 ≡ τθ
1− τθ2K
1/σ
2 , Ĉ1 ≡
τθ
1− τθ2
(
1 + θ2
2
K2
)1/σ
,
and Cd2 (C1) is implicitly given by
C2 − θC1 = φ ·
(
C1 + θC2
C2
)1/σ
, φ ≡
(
1 + θ2
2θ(1 + τ)
K2
)1/σ
. (11)
The function Cd2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave.
The best response function of Agent 2, depicted in the left panel of Figure 2, consists
of three segments that correspond to the following cases. If the output of Agent 1 is high
enough, Agent 2 is not constrained by destructive envy and displays the standard KUJ
behavior. If the output of Agent 1 is in the intermediate range, the best response of Agent
2 would be not to allow destructive envy at stage 2 by constraining his own effort at stage
1. This intermediate region is the “fear segment,” in which Agent 2 exerts the maximum
12This assumption is a convenient regularity condition that is not crucial for the main results, but
resolves ambiguities in certain propositions.
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possible effort that prevents destruction at stage 2. Finally, if the output of Agent 1 is
low, it becomes too costly for Agent 2 to avoid destruction by constraining effort and the
optimal action is to allow some of it.
BR2
C1
C2
Ĉ1 C˜1
BR1
C1
C2
Ĉ2
Figure 2: Best responses of Agent 2 (left) and Agent 1 (right).
Agent 1 is forward-looking and knows his own second-stage behavior when optimizing
at the investment stage:
v((1− d∗)Y1 − θp∗Y2)− Y1/K1 −→ max
Y1
(12)
Lemma 2 (BR of Agent 1). The best-response function of Agent 1, BR1 ≡ C∗1(C2),
has the following form:
C∗1(C2) =
{
K
1/σ
1 + θC2, if C2 6 Ĉ2;
Cd1 (C2), if C2 > Ĉ2,
(13)
where
Ĉ2 ≡ K
1/σ
1
θ(τ − 1)
and Cd1 (C2) is implicitly given by
C1 − θC2 = ψ ·
(
C1
C1 + θC2
)1/σ
, ψ ≡
(
1 + τ
τ
K1
)1/σ
. (14)
The function Cd1 (C2) is strictly increasing and convex.
The best response function of Agent 1, depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, consists
of two segments. If the output of Agent 2 is low enough, Agent 1 prefers to catch up
peacefully without causing destruction. This is the KUJ case. If, however, Y2 is too high,
destruction is the best response.
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Equilibria. Depending on parameter values, the envy game may end up in three
different types of equilibria which we consider in turn.
1. Keeping up with the Joneses equilibrium (KUJE). This equilibrium would always
emerge if destruction were not possible (right panel of Figure 3). Its features are well-known
in economics literature and have been formally analyzed by Frank (1985) and Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004), among others. In the present model it arises when the “competitive
segments” of the best response functions intersect (left panel of Figure 3) and is given by
CKUJi = Y
KUJ
i =
K
1/σ
i + θK
1/σ
j
1− θ2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (15)
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
Figure 3: KUJE in the envy game with (left) and without (right) the second stage.
2. Fear equilibrium (FE). In this case the richer agent constrains his effort to avoid
destructive envy at the second stage of the game. He consumes right at the point that
makes it not optimal for the poorer agent to engage in destruction. This equilibrium
resembles the features that have been documented by anthropologists and were discussed
in Section 2. It arises when the “fear segment” of BR2 intersects BR1 at the kink point
(left panel of Figure 4) and is given by
CF1 = Y
F
1 =
τK
1/σ
1
τ − 1 , C
F
2 = Y
F
2 =
K
1/σ
1
θ(τ − 1) . (16)
3. Destructive equilibrium (DE). In this equilibrium it is not optimal for Agent 2 to
reduce effort to completely avoid destructive envy and he accommodates some of it. Agent
1 in response chooses his optimal destruction intensity. Equilibrium consumption levels
are implicitly given by the system: {
CD2 = C
d
2 (C
D
1 ),
CD1 = C
d
1 (C
D
2 ).
(17)
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BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
Figure 4: Fear (left) and destructive (right) equilibria.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows a generic destructive equilibrium, which occurs at
the intersection of “destructive segments.” It follows from the properties of Cd2 (C1) and
Cd1 (C2) that they can only intersect once (see the proof of Proposition 1).
Now that it is clear what kind of equilibria can potentially arise as an outcome of the
envy game, the question is under what conditions each of them is observed. The following
proposition provides a full taxonomy of equilibria in terms of three exogenous parameters:
λ, the initial level of inequality (economic environment), τ , the level of property rights
protection (institutional environment), and θ, the strength of relative comparisons (cultural
environment).
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium of the envy game). There exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the envy game. Denote k ≡ K1/K2. Then, if k > k˜, it is the KUJ equilibrium
(15). If kˆ 6 k < k˜, it is the fear equilibrium (16). Finally, if k < kˆ, it is the destructive
equilibrium (17). The threshold values for k are
k˜ ≡
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]σ
, kˆ ≡ (1 + θ
2)
2
k˜ < k˜ < 1. (18)
This result can be expressed in terms of regions for λ, τ , and θ. The relevant thresholds
are uniquely determined by (18) accounting for the assumption that 1 < τ < 1/θ.
Given the setup of the game, this result is very intuitive. Other things equal, the
standard KUJ equilibrium is more likely to emerge if the level of inequality is not high,
property rights are well-protected, and relative comparisons are not very strong. For the
intermediate levels of these parameters the fear equilibrium emerges. Finally, poor property
rights protection, high inequality, and strong relative comparisons make the destructive
equilibrium more likely to arise.
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It is important to emphasize, however, that the three exogenous parameters of interest
(not counting σ) jointly determine the equilibrium type. For instance, just having low
inequality is not enough to obtain the KUJ equilibrium. If, at the same time, institutions
are very weak (destructive technology is very efficient) and/or relative standing concerns
are very strong, the economy may still end up in the fear or destructive equilibrium. Note
also that the model is scale-free in the sense that the type of equilibrium does not depend
on the absolute level of total endowment, K.
Comparative statics. The next important issue to address is how the parameters of
interest affect economic performance (measured by final outputs) across different equilibria.
The nature of these alternative equilibria is very different, which generates opposite effects
of envy on economic performance.
As follows from (15), in the KUJ equilibrium outputs do not depend on τ since de-
structive envy is not binding. The effect of θ is straightforward: increasing the strength
of relative concerns in the KUJ equilibrium acts as additional incentive to work, which
leads to higher levels of effort and output. Positional externality leads to overworking and
overconsumption compared to what is socially optimal (Frank, 1985).
The effect of raising λ (increasing equality) on aggregate output depends crucially on
σ. Equations (1) and (15) imply that the total output is
Y KUJ = Y KUJ1 + Y
KUJ
2 =
λ1/σ + (1− λ)1/σ
1− θ K
1
σ . (19)
If σ > 1, it is a strictly concave and increasing function of λ in the interval (0, 1/2).
Concavity of outputs in endowments seems more natural than a kind of nondecreasing
returns to scale that would emerge under σ 6 1.
The total effect of redistribution on private outputs consists of two parts: wealth effect
and comparison effect. Wealth effect is just the direct effect of making one agent poorer
and the other richer. In case of increasing λ the wealth effect is positive for Agent 1 and
negative for Agent 2. The total wealth effect on output is positive if σ > 1. Private output
is a concave function of own wealth and so, redistribution from the rich agent to the poor
has a positive net marginal effect. Comparison effects reflect the fact that the reference
group becomes poorer for Agent 1 and richer for Agent 2. Consequently, comparison effect
is negative for Agent 1 and positive for Agent 2. The total comparison effect has the same
sign as the total wealth effect. Under σ > 1 private output is a concave function of the other
agent’s wealth and redistribution from the rich agent to the poor has a positive marginal
effect, since the negative comparison effect on the output of the poor is outweighed by the
positive effect on the output of the rich.
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Next, consider the fear equilibrium (16). In this case the outcomes depend on τ , the
measure of property rights protection. Raising τ (reducing the quality of institutions)
decreases the tolerance of Agent 1 for inequality and aggravates the “fear constraint” of
Agent 2. This means that with higher τ Agent 2 has to produce less to avoid destructive
envy which leads to lower total output given by
Y F = Y F1 + Y
F
2 =
λ1/σ(1 + τθ)
θ(τ − 1) K
1
σ . (20)
The effect of raising θ is similar since it, too, decreases the tolerance for inequality. This
is in stark contrast with the role of positional concern in the KUJ equilibrium. In the latter
case it acts as an additional incentive to work while in the fear equilibrium it constrains
productive effort by increasing the hazard of destructive envy. On the other hand, the
effect of raising equality in the fear equilibrium is unambiguously positive. Increasing λ
means a positive wealth effect for Agent 1 and, since the output of Agent 2 is tied to that
of Agent 1, this translates into higher output of Agent 2. That is, in FE redistribution
from the rich to the poor increases investment and final production by alleviating the fear
constraint.
Destructive equilibrium is harder to analyze analytically. Multiple effects are at work
which makes the aggregate comparative statics with respect to θ ambiguous. If inequality
is high or tolerance for inequality is low, stronger envy leads to substantial destruction
which may lower the consumption of Agent 2, as well as total final output (left panel of
Figure 6). In contrast, if the destructive environment is not severe (or σ, the catching-
up propensity, is high), the stimulating effect of envy dominates (right panel of Figure
6). Thus, comparative statics in DE combines the features of FE and KUJE. Moreover,
it can be shown that, under σ > 1, higher τ and lower λ unambiguously decrease total
consumption. The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics results of this
section.
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics of the envy game). Across equilibria the effects
of λ, θ, and τ on total final output are as follows.
1. KUJE:
(a) ∂Y/∂λ > 0; ∂Y1/∂λ > 0; ∂Y2/∂λ > 0 iff θ > [(1− λ)/λ] 1−σσ .
(b) ∂Y/∂θ > 0; ∂Yi/∂θ > 0.
(c) ∂Y/∂τ = ∂Yi/∂τ = 0.
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2. FE:
(a) ∂Y/∂λ > 0; ∂Yi/∂λ > 0;
(b) ∂Y/∂θ < 0; ∂Y1/∂θ = 0; ∂Y2/∂θ < 0;
(c) ∂Y/∂τ < 0; ∂Yi/∂τ < 0.
3. DE:
(a) ∂C/∂λ > 0; ∂C1/∂λ > 0; ∂C2/∂λ ≶ 0;
(b) ∂C/∂θ ≶ 0; ∂C1/∂θ > 0; ∂C2/∂θ ≶ 0;
(c) ∂C/∂τ < 0; ∂Ci/∂τ < 0.
Proposition 2 makes clear that the mechanics of the qualitatively different equilibria of
the envy game may imply contrasting comparative statics. Stronger envy is detrimental
for economic performance in the fear equilibrium, increases total output under the KUJ-
type competition, and has an ambiguous effect in DE. Higher inequality has a negative
effect across all equilibria types. Well-protected private property rights are conducive to
economic performance in both FE and DE and play no role beyond the KUJE threshold.
Overall, Proposition 2 establishes the relationship between aggregate economic perfor-
mance and the parameters of the model, reflecting economic, institutional and cultural
environment (see Figures 5 and 6).
λ
C
λ˜ λˆ0 0.5
τ
C
τˆ τ˜1 1/θ
Figure 5: Inequality (left), property rights (right), and economic performance.
The analysis of this section implies that the potentially adverse effects of envy may
create incentives for actions in order to overcome them. The following two sections address
this issue.
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θC
θˆ θ˜0 1/τ
θ
C
θˆ θ˜0 1/τ
Figure 6: Envy and economic performance.
4 Voluntary Redistribution
One way to deal with destruction caused by envy is through redistribution of various forms.
Cancian (1965) and Foster (1979) examine redistributive practices in Latin American peas-
ant societies, such as ceremonial expenditures and sponsorship of religious fiestas by the
rich (cargo system). In particular, Cancian (1965, p. 140) suggests that “service in the
cargo system legitimizes the wealth differences that do exist and thus prevents disruptive
envy.” Platteau (2000, chapter 5) examines similar arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Asian village communities, where “in seeking neighbourer’s goodwill or in fearing their
envy, incentives operate for the rich to redistribute income and wealth to the poor” (p. 235).
Mui (1995, section 4) discusses sharing in the emerging market economies of the Soviet
Union and China manifested in contributions of the nascent entrepreneurial class to charity
or local public goods, which he sees as an attempt to alleviate destructive envy. Mui then
goes on to formally show how sharing can support the adoption of innovation in equilibrium.
Some authors (Schoeck, 1969; Ferna´ndez de la Mora, 1987) even see the modern progressive
taxation system as a remnant of “egalitarian envy.”
Within the framework of Section 3, a natural question is whether the rich would be
willing to share the fruits of their effort to avoid destructive envy and how this affects the
possible equilibrium outcomes of this modified envy game. Consider the case of ex-post
sharing, that is, after investment has taken place. Assume that Agent 2 can make a transfer
to Agent 1 before stage 2 begins, as shown in Figure 7.
Consider the node of the game where the rich agent decides on transfer having seen
the outcomes of the investment stage. Obviously, non-zero transfer may only be optimal
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Effort Li Outcomes Yi
Stage 1 (Investment, Transfer)
Production/Destruction Consumption Ci Payoffs U
i
Stage 2 (Production, Destruction, Consumption)
Transfer T
Figure 7: Timing of events in the envy game with transfers.
if Y1 < τθY2, i.e., destructive envy is binding. In this case Agent 2 may want to make a
positive transfer T to lower the intensity of destruction, d∗. Given that effort is sunk at
this stage, Agent 2 maximizes 13
v(p∗(T )(Y2 − T )− θ(1− d∗(T ))(Y1 + T )) −→ max
T
s.t. 0 6 T 6 T¯ , (21)
where T¯ ≡ (τθY2 − Y1)/(1 + τθ) is the minimum transfer sufficient to completely avoid
destruction. Lemma 3 characterizes the optimal transfer of Agent 2.
Lemma 3 (Optimal transfer). For Y1/Y2 6 τθ, the optimal transfer is T = T¯ if and
only if τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ). Otherwise,
T =
{
T ∗, if Y1/Y2 < µ;
0, if Y1/Y2 > µ,
where T ∗ is given by the first-order condition of (21) for the interior solution and 0 < µ < τθ
is a constant depending on τ and θ (see Appendix).
In what follows consider the simple case τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ). Then, as established in
Lemma 3, it is always optimal for Agent 2 to make the full transfer T¯ . Intuitively, the rich
individual will be willing to do so if T¯ is low. The next lemma establishes what the best
response of Agent 2 looks like under full transfer.
Lemma 4 (BR of Agent 2 with full transfer). The best response function of Agent 2,
BRT2 ≡ Y ∗2 (Y1), has the following form:
Y ∗2 (Y1) =

K
1/σ
2 + θY1, if Y1 > Y˜1;
Y1 · 1τθ , if Y˘1 < Y1 < Y˜1;
(γ2K2)
1/σ − Y1, if Y1 6 Y˘1,
(22)
where
Y˜1 ≡ τθ
1− τθ2K
1/σ
2 , Y˘1 ≡
τθ
1 + τθ
(γ2K2)
1/σ, γ2 ≡
[
1− τθ2
1 + τθ
]1−σ
.
13Formally, (1 − d∗)Y1 − θp∗Y2 is positive if and only if Y2/Y1 < (1 + τ)2/4τθ. Otherwise, U1 = −∞
and Agent 1 is indifferent between any feasible destruction intensities. For concreteness, focus on d∗ as
the best response of Agent 1 in this case.
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Now, instead of “destructive region” the best response of Agent 2 has a “transfer region”
(left panel of Figure 8). For low levels of Y1 it is optimal to prevent destruction through
transfers rather than by producing less in the first stage.
BRT2
Y1
Y2
Y˘1 Y˜1
BRT1
Y1
Y2
Y˜2
Y˘2
Figure 8: Best responses in the envy game with transfers.
Agent 1 anticipates to get the full transfer in case of high inequality, because he knows
that the rich agent will be afraid of destructive envy. He takes this into account when
choosing his first period effort. Intuitively, given the high potential output of the rich,
Agent 1 has an incentive to invest as little effort as possible and cause a threat of destructive
envy thereby provoking the rich to make a transfer. Lemma 5 gives a characterization of
the best response function of Agent 1 for a special case that illustrates all possible kinds
of equilibria that can emerge in a modified envy game.
Lemma 5 (BR of Agent 1 with full transfer). Under parametric conditions (A7) and
(A8) provided in the Appendix the best response function of Agent 1, BRT1 ≡ Y ∗1 (Y2), is
given by
Y ∗1 (Y2) =

K
1/σ
1 + θY2, if Y2 6 Y˜2;
(γ1K1)
1/σ − Y2, if Y˜2 < Y2 < Y˘2;
0, if Y2 > Y˘2,
(23)
where
Y˜2 ≡ σ(1− γ
1/σ
1 )
(1− σ)(1 + θ)K
1/σ
1 , Y˘2 ≡ (γ1K1)1/σ, γ1 ≡
[
θ(τ − 1)
1 + τθ
]1−σ
.
The right panel of Figure 8 depicts this function. Note, in particular, that there is a
discontinuity at point Y˜2, as it becomes optimal for Agent 1 to switch to the KUJ-type
best response when Y2 is low enough. Under alternative parametric restrictions BR
T
1 looks
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very similar except that there may be no intermediate region, in which Agent 1 prefers to
work more than the minimum required to make a credible threat.
Given the best responses of the agents, two qualitatively different types of equilibria
may arise: fear equilibrium with transfers (FT) and KUJ equilibrium. Moreover, as shown
in the bottom panels of Figure 9, multiplicity of equilibria cannot be ruled out. Proposition
3 characterizes the equilibria under conditions of Lemma 5.
Proposition 3 (Equilibria of the envy game with transfers). The envy game with
transfers has: 1) a unique KUJ equilibrium (15) if k > γ2/γ1; 2) a unique fear equilibrium
with full transfer of the form
{Y FT1 , Y FT2 } = {0, (γ2K2)1/σ};
{CFT1 , CFT2 } = {ε(γ2K2)1/σ, (1− ε)(γ2K2)1/σ},
(24)
if k < ω, where ε ≡ [τθ/(1 + τθ)] and ω ≡ [σ(1 − θ)(1 − γ1/σ1 )/(1 − σ) − θ]−σ; 3) two
equilibria (15) and (24) if ω < k < γ2/γ1; 4) multiple equilibria with full transfer of the
form
{Y FT1 , Y FT2 } = {Y FT1 , (γ2K2)1/σ − Y FT1 }, 0 6 Y FT1 6 Y˜2;
{CFT1 , CFT2 } = {Y FT1 + T¯ , Y FT2 − T¯},
(25)
if k = γ2/γ1, along with a KUJ equilibrium.
Destructive and fear equilibria of the basic model are replaced by “fear equilibrium
with transfers,” in which the rich agent redistributes part of his output to avoid destructive
envy of the poor agent. Since inequality is what matters for the amount of destruction, by
investing nothing in the first stage the poor agent creates the fear of envy forcing the rich
to share. In turn, when the poor agent expects to receive a transfer, he does not need to
work hard and chooses to produce the minimum amount needed to create a credible threat
to destroy. This type of equilibrium arises when initial inequality is high. In contrast, if it
is low, the only possible outcome of the game is the standard KUJ equilibrium. It is easy
to see that in the baseline case σ > 1 both γ2/γ1 and ω are increasing in τ and θ, that is,
reducing tolerance for inequality increases the likelihood of the redistributive equilibrium.
This is intuitive and parallels the taxonomy of equilibria in Proposition 1.
Interestingly, the possibility of transfers gives rise to (stable) multiple equilibria for
intermediate levels of inequality (bottom panels of Figure 9). This implies that societies
with similar characteristics and moderate wealth differences may end up in one of the two
alternative equilibria: one with redistribution and fear of destructive envy and the other
with KUJ-type competition. The following proposition highlights the contrast between the
two equilibria.
20
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
Figure 9: Equilibria in the envy game with transfers.
Proposition 4. Assume that ω < k < γ1/γ1, that is, the envy game with transfers
has an FT equilibrium (24) and a KUJ equilibrium (15). Then, the FT equilibrium is
characterized by: 1) higher ex-post inequality, that is, CFT1 /C
FT
2 < C
KUJ
1 /C
KUJ
2 ; 2) lower
total output, that is, Y FT2 < Y
KUJ.
Curiously, despite redistribution taking place in FT equilibrium, it turns out to be
more unequal ex-post than the KUJE, in which catching up takes place. This is not
surprising. In fact, anthropologists documented that egalitarian norms and redistributive
mechanism often fail to achieve equality. For instance, in his account of the cargo system
in a Maya society Cancian (1965) argues that “there is, in effect, sufficient leveling. . . to
satisfy normative prescriptions, but not enough to produce an economically homogeneous
community” (p. 140).
The second result of Proposition 4 is intuitive. In the KUJE, positional externality
makes both agents work hard and leads to high total output. In FT equilibrium, the poor
agent does not work at all to create a threat of destructive envy, while the rich provides
consumption for both. The externality is thus neutralized at least for the poor agent. In
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fact, it can be shown that the poor agent always gets a higher utility in the FT equilibrium,
precisely for this reason. For the rich agent welfare analysis is more complicated, and, in
general, overworking under KUJ competition is not necessarily dominated by overworking
under the fear of envy. However, in the case when the two equilibria are in fact Pareto
rankable the FT equilibrium will be dominant.
The welfare analysis of the envy model is relevant not only in the situation with multiple
equilibria. The following section goes back to the basic model to investigate in detail the
welfare properties of different equilibria and the prospects of cooperation in choosing the
institutional parameter, τ .
5 Welfare and property rights protection
This section examines how the degree of property rights protection affects the welfare of
individuals in the basic model of Section 3. In particular, one might analyze in a crude
form the possibility of institutional change represented by a change in τ . Assume that
agents can agree to alter τ if this leads to a Pareto-superior equilibrium. Even such a
simplistic approach allows to see the fundamental differences between alternative equilibria
and uncover the nontrivial welfare implications of improving property rights protection in
the presence of positional externalities.
The connection between the emergence of property rights and externalities was famously
considered by Demsetz (1967). He argued that the main function of property rights is to
internalize externalities, and institutional change in this domain is intended to cope with
new externality problems. In the context of the present theory it is the consumption
externality that makes property rights matter. As shown below, it is not the emergence of
property rights protection but its demise that may internalize this externality.
We start by analyzing different types of equilibria separately. First, as follows from
(15), the welfare of individuals in the KUJ equilibrium is independent of τ . In the fear
equilibrium, however, τ matters, since it affects the effort and output of the agents. More-
over, it can be easily established that utilities of both agents in the fear equilibrium depend
positively on τ . As follows from (16), these are given by
U1F =
[
1
1− σ −
τ
τ − 1
]
K
1−σ
σ
1 ,
U2F =
[
1
1− σ ·
(
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
)1−σ
− 1
θ(τ − 1) ·
K1
K2
]
K
1−σ
σ
1 .
(26)
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Differentiation with respect to τ shows that ∂U1F/∂τ > 0 always and ∂U
2
F/∂τ > 0 if and
only if K1/K2 > (1 − θ2) · [θ(τ − 1)/(1 − τθ2)]σ which, as follows from Proposition 1, is
always true in the fear equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In case of Agent 1, notice that the relative
consumption term, C1 − θC2 = K1/σ1 , is independent of τ , while effort, L1 = ττ−1K1/σ−11 ,
decreases in τ since lower effort is required to produce a lower level of output caused by
loosening the property rights protection. So, under higher τ he is able to maintain the
same relative standing with lower effort. Agent 2 loses somewhat in his relative position,
that is, C2 − θC1 is decreasing in τ , but he is still willing to trade it off for more leisure if
K1/K2 is high enough. Large K1 means that the reference group is richer which induces
extra effort, while small K2 means that maintaining relative standing requires more effort,
again causing extra work.
Given this property of the FE, if we allow the agents to collectively choose the level
of property rights protection, it will be a Pareto improvement for them to move from any
fear equilibrium E towards the kink point E ′ marking the border between the fear and
destructive regions (see Figure 10). Would they want to move inside the destructive region?
It turns out that the welfare analysis in the destructive equilibrium is more complicated
and in general yields ambiguous conclusions. Generically, two scenarios arise. In the first
one, utility of Agent 1 is increasing in τ while utility of Agent 2 is decreasing. This is
not surprising since higher τ means that it becomes easier for Agent 1 to destroy, while
Agent 2 suffers more from destructive envy. In this scenario, the individuals have a conflict
of interests over the level of property rights protection and, under Pareto criterion, they
won’t move deeper in the destructive region, staying at the kink point. This also means
that once the agents are in a DE, they won’t move towards the fear region, since this
won’t be profitable for Agent 1.14 The other plausible scenario is that both agents prefer
better property rights protection in the destructive region in which case there is movement
towards the kink point E ′ from both sides.
Next, consider the following thought experiment. Assume the agents are in the fear
equilibrium. Would they want to adopt a lower value of τ that would move them to the
KUJ equilibrium? The following proposition provides conditions under which the agents
will (not) want to adopt better property rights protection and find themselves in the KUJ
“rat race.”
14Note, however, that, as established in Proposition 2, total output decreases in τ in DE which opens a
possibility of compensatory side payments on part of the rich.
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BR′2
C1
C2
BR1
E
E ′
BR′1
BR2
Figure 10: Pareto improving increase in τ in the fear equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Let kˆ 6 k < k˜, that is, agents are in FE. Then, ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
1) If θ > θ¯, adopting a (lower) τ that would bring up the KUJ equilibrium is a Pareto
worsening; 2) If θ 6 θ¯, ∃! k¯(τ) ∈ [kˆ, k˜), such that adopting such τ is a Pareto worsening
if and only if k > k¯. Private outputs in the initial FE are always lower than those that
would have been achieved by improving the property rights protection.
The intuition of Proposition 5 is the same as in the above discussion of choosing τ in the
fear equilibrium. As shown in the Appendix, Agent 1 will always prefer FE. In particular,
his relative standing is the same across equilibria, but the amount of leisure is always higher
in FE. The rich agent will not want to move to KUJE if in that equilibrium he will have to
work a lot to support his status. That happens if either relative comparisons are strong (θ
is high) or there is low inequality (k is large). In these cases the rich would prefer to stay
in FE, in which the fear of destructive envy restrains effort and curbs the consumption
externality leading to overworking in the KUJ equilibrium. Thus, worse property rights
protection corrects the distortion caused by positional concerns.
So, under conditions of Proposition 5, both agents are happier in an equilibrium with
poor property rights protection and lower standard of living, rather than in a high-output
KUJ equilibrium. This is reminiscent of Sen’s (1983, p. 160) observation that “a grumbling
rich man may well be less happy than a contented peasant, but he does have a higher
standard of living,” as well as what Graham (2010) calls the “paradox of happy peasants
and miserable millionaires.” Proposition 5 offers one possible explanation of the “paradox.”
Figure 11 illustrates the case, in which moving from FE to KUJE by improving property
rights protection is a Pareto worsening (left panel) in spite of increased private outputs
(right panel).
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Figure 11: From FE to KUJE: Improving the property rights protection.
It is instructive to also read Proposition 5 in the “reverse” order, assuming that initially
agents are in the KUJ equilibrium.
Proposition 5′. Let k > k˜, that is, agents are in KUJE. Then, ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that: 1) If θ > θ¯, adopting a (higher) τ that would bring up the fear equilibrium is a
Pareto improvement; 2) If θ 6 θ¯, ∃! k¯(τ) ∈ (kˆ, k˜), such that adopting such τ is a Pareto
improvement if and only if k > k¯. Private outputs in the initial KUJE are always higher
than those that would be achieved by distorting the property rights protection.
Taken literally, Proposition 5′ may be seen as a formalization of a more than a century-
old argument raised by Veblen (1891) in an attempt to explain the support for socialist
movement, specifically, for the abolition of private property rights. Veblen argued that
this demand is driven precisely by the discontent caused by the forces of emulation that
is exacerbated in an industrial society (p. 65–66): “The ground of the unrest with which
we are concerned is, very largely, jealousy, – envy, if you choose: and the ground of this
particular form of jealousy that makes for socialism, is to be found in the institution of
private property.” Moreover, Veblen goes on to describe what in the model can be called a
transition from KUJE (“keep up appearances”) to FE (“socialism”): “Under modern con-
ditions the struggle for existence has, in a very appreciable degree, been transformed into a
struggle to keep up appearances. The ultimate ground of this struggle to keep up appear-
ances by otherwise unnecessary expenditure, is the institution of private property. . . With
the abolition of private property, the characteristic of human nature which now finds its
exercise in this form of emulation, should logically find exercise in other, perhaps nobler
and socially more serviceable, activities.” He then emphasizes that the abolition of the
KUJ competition would lessen the amount of labor and output required to support the
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economy. This is exactly what happens after transition to the fear equilibrium: output
and labor supply fall, individuals enjoy more leisure and are happier with less output. The
rich will prefer well-protected property rights if inequality is high enough since moving to
FE would mean losing too much in terms of relative standing. Thus, in a KUJE with
relatively high inequality there is a conflict of interests over this decision, or, in Veblen’s
terms, different sentiments towards the socialist movement.
The result that both agents may prefer inferior institutions is important in understand-
ing why societies may be stuck for some time in the FE even if in the long-run the transition
to KUJE is inevitable. This issue is explored in the dynamic framework of next section.
6 Envy and Dynamics of Inequality
So far, the analysis focused on the equilibria of the static model in which inequality of
endowments was taken as fixed. In this section intergenerational links are introduced that
allow to explore the dynamics of inequality. It is shown how an economy can evolve endoge-
nously through different envy regimes following the dynamics of inequality. Incorporation
of the insights from the static model into a dynamic framework allows to examine the
changing role of envy in the transition process.
Environment. The economy is populated by a sequence of non-overlapping genera-
tions, indexed by t > 0. Time is discrete, and each generation lives for one period. The
initial population consists of 2 homogeneous groups of people (representative agents), the
poor and the rich, with initial endowments K10 and K20 > K10. Each person has 1 child,
so that in each time period two groups of people are descendants of the initially rich and
initially poor. Parents care about their children and leave bequests, bit, i = 1, 2, at the end
of each period t.15 In particular, they derive utility not just from relative consumption but
the relative Cobb-Douglas aggregator of consumption, now denoted cit, and bequest, bit:
U it =
pi(c1−αit b
α
it − θc1−αjt bαjt)1−σ
1− σ − Lit, (27)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, 0 < α < 1 parameterizes the fraction of final output allocated
to bequest, and pi ≡ [(1 − α)1−ααα]σ−1 is a normalization constant. Consumption and
bequest are made out of final output, Cit, so that bit + cit = Cit. This formulation leaves
the workings of the basic model from Section 3 intact while introducing dynamic linkages.
15These bequests may represent any kind of investment in children that increases the productivity of
their effort, for example, expenditure on human capital.
26
Dynamical system. The initial endowment of generation t+ 1, Kit+1, is assumed to
depend on the endowment of their parents and parental investment in children:
Kit+1 = K
β
itbit = K
β
itαCit, (28)
where i = 1, 2, and 0 < 1 − β < 1 is the rate of geometric depreciation of parental
endowment.16 Note that Proposition 1 holds each period t, and the level of initial inequality
in period t+ 1 is determined endogenously:
kt+1 ≡ K1t+1
K2t+1
= kβt ·
C1t
C2t
, (29)
with the initial condition 0 < k0 < 1. The joint dynamics of K1t and K2t depends on the
type of equilibrium, in which the economy resides, and the equilibrium next period is, in
turn, determined by the economic outcomes of the current period. Lemma 6 characterizes
this dynamical system and follows directly from Proposition 1 and the law of motion (28).
Lemma 6 (Dynamics of endowments). The two-dimensional dynamical system for K1t
and K2t is given by[
K1t+1
K2t+1
]
=

α
1−θ2 [K
β
1t(K
1/σ
1t + θK
1/σ
2t ), K
β
2t(K
1/σ
2t + θK
1/σ
1t )], if kt > k˜;
α
θ(τ−1) [τθK
1/σ+β
1t , K
β
2tK
1/σ
1t ], if kˆ 6 kt < k˜;
α[Kβ1t · CD1 (K1t, K2t), Kβ2t · CD2 (K1t, K2t)], if kt < kˆ,
(30)
where CD1 (K1t, K2t) and C
D
2 (K1t, K2t) are the final outputs in DE given by (17).
The thresholds k˜ and kˆ divide the (K1t, K2t) phase plane into three regions according
to the types of equilibria (see Figures 12 and 13): KUJ, F (fear) and D (destruction). In
each of these regions the motion is governed by the corresponding part of the dynamical
system (30). To rule out explosive dynamics it is assumed throughout this section that
σ(1 − β) > 1. This implies, in particular, that σ > 1 so that the results of the previous
sections hold.
It is convenient to analyze a companion one-dimensional difference equation driving the
dynamics of inequality. Some of its properties are established in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Dynamics of inequality). The dynamics of kt is given by
kt+1 =

g1(kt) ≡ [k1/σ+βt + θkβt ]/[1 + θk1/σt ], if kt > k˜;
g2(kt) ≡ τθkβt , if kˆ 6 kt < k˜;
g3(kt), if kt < kˆ,
(31)
16Persistence of endowments is introduced to make the dynamics of the model more realistic. If β = 0,
the main qualitative results remain unchanged but the economy will not stay in the fear equilibrium for
more than 1 period.
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where g3(kt) is implicitly given by
kt =
τ(1 + θ2)
2θ(1 + τ)2
· (zt+1 + θ)
2
zt+1
·
(
zt+1 − θ
1− θzt+1
)σ
, zt+1 ≡ kt+1/kβt . (32)
Moreover, kt+1 > kt for all 0 < kt < 1.
In what follows the analysis focuses on the dynamics in the two empirically most relevant
regions, the fear region and the KUJ region. The two lemmas below characterize the
behavior of the system in these regions.
Lemma 8 (KUJ region dynamics). The system converges to a unique stable “equal”
long-run steady state K¯KUJ1 = K¯
KUJ
2 = K¯ = [α/(1− θ)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 . The steady-state levels of
output are equal to Y¯ KUJ1 = Y¯
KUJ
2 = Y¯ = K¯
1/σ/(1 − θ). The evolution of endowments is
determined by the loci
∆Ki ≡ Kit+1 −Kit = 0 : K1/σit + θK1/σjt = K1−βit · (1− θ2)/α, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
such that dKit/dKjt > 0 and d
2Kit/dK
2
jt < 0 for each locus.
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Figure 12: Dynamics and steady states in the KUJ (left) and fear (right) regions.
Figure 12 (left panel) depicts schematically the dynamics in the KUJ region. If σ(1−
β) > 1, the initially poor eventually catch up with the initially rich, and in the steady
state both are “running to keep in the same place” (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004).
Lemma 9 (Fear region dynamics). In the fear region the system moves towards a
unique stable “unequal” long-run steady state K¯1 = [ατ/(τ−1)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 , K¯2 = K¯1 ·(τθ)
1
β−1 .
The corresponding levels of output are Y¯1 = [τ/(τ − 1)]K¯1/σ1 and Y¯2 = K¯1/σ1 /[θ(τ − 1)].
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This steady state is, however, unattainable, since it is located in the KUJ region, that is,
the system moves to the KUJ region before reaching the fear steady state. The evolution
of endowments is determined by the loci
∆K1 = 0 : K1t = K¯1 = [ατ/(τ − 1)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 ;
∆K2 = 0 : K1t = K
σ(1−β)
2t · [θ(τ − 1)/α]σ.
Figure 12 (right panel) depicts schematically the dynamics in the fear region. It is
instructive to look at the comparative statics of the long-run levels of output with respect
to τ and θ. They resemble the results of the static model: in the KUJ steady state, outputs
are increasing in θ and independent of τ ; in the (unattainable) fear steady state, the output
of group 1 is independent of θ and decreasing in τ while the output of group 2 is decreasing
in θ and τ . Note also that, despite their qualitatively different nature, as τθ → 1, the two
long-run equilibria get closer and coincide in the limit.
Given Lemmas 7–9, it is easy to establish how the possible development trajectories
look. The long-run convergence result is stated in Proposition 6 and depicted in Figure 13.
Proposition 6 (Long-run convergence). Starting with any initial conditions {K10, K20},
such that 0 < k0 < 1, the endowments converge to a unique stable long-run “equal” steady
state of the KUJ region, K¯. Inequality decreases monotonically along the transition path.
Thus, if the economy starts off, say, in destructive region, it experiences a transition
to the KUJ steady state, possibly passing through the fear region and staying there for a
while. What allows to switch between alternative regimes is that inequality decreases over
time causing phase transitions.
As established in Section 3, the effect of envy on economic performance is opposite in
fear and KUJ regions, which implies the changing role of envy in the transition process.
Matt (2003) examines the cultural change with regard to envy in the American consumer
society in 1890–1930, the period when the phrase “keeping up with the Joneses” came into
popular use. She quotes (p. 4) an essay from the Christian Advocate newspaper (1926), in
which the “new version” of the tenth commandment is documented with dismay: “Thou
shalt not be outdone by thy neighbor’s house, thou shalt not be outdone by thy neighbor’s
wife, nor his manservant, nor his car, nor anything – irrespective of its price or thine own
ability – anything that is thy neighbor’s.” The fear of envy goes away and the emotion
is used by producers and sellers to advertise their products. Envy suppression paves the
way to envy creation via marketing (Belk, 2008). As emulation becomes the engine of
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Figure 13: Evolution through envy regimes.
consumer society, the factors that make positional concerns more important contribute to
higher outputs and overworking aggravating the consumption externality.
Religion and ideology are important cultural elements that may affect the intensity of
social comparisons. Major world religions denounce envy. Buddhism considers envy to be
an evil state of mind and teaches that a virtuous person will celebrate the good fortune
of a neighbor (Clanton, 2006). Islam condemns Hasad, destructive envy, although permits
Ghibtah, envy that is free from malice, or emulation.17
The condemnation of envy is probably the strongest in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Envy is one of the deadly sins and features prominently in the tenth commandment. In
fact, Aquaro (2004) argues that envy is a core emotion driving most sinful behaviors that
created the need for the ten commandments to combat these sins. Or, as Schoeck (1969)
puts it, “a society from which all cause of envy had disappeared would not need the moral
message of Christianity” (p. 160). He also argues that the Roman Catholic belief in the
will of god, the Protestant work ethic, and the Calvinist concept of predestination were
instrumental in combating envy and increasing tolerance for inequality.
In the present dynamic model such religious and moral teachings may be seen as causing
downward pressure on θ. Assume that the economy is in the fear region and θ falls. Then,
17For analysis linking envy, inequality, and contemporary revival of Islam see Carvalho (2009).
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Figure 14: Dynamics of inequality under low (left) and high (right) τ .
as follows from Proposition 2, outputs will rise because the fear constraint of the rich is
alleviated permitting higher effort without fear of destructive envy. Moreover, as follows
directly from (18), a fall in θ lowers the inequality threshold k˜ contributing to a faster
transition from FE to KUJE. As the economy enters the KUJ region, destructive envy
turns into emulation, and the change in θ has an opposite impact on economic performance.
In KUJ region, the same factors that drive the society out of the fear region by reducing
the strength of relative concerns have a negative effect on output.
An example of ideology affecting θ is material egalitarianism. The concept of everyone
being equal is effective in fostering social comparison and lowering tolerance for inequality
(see discussion in Section 2).
It is tempting to incorporate the result of Section 5 in this simple dynamic framework.
In particular, assume that the first generation that finds itself in the fear equilibrium is
to decide on the level of property rights protection, and conditions of Proposition 5 hold.
Then, it is optimal for both agents to increase τ . Then, it can be shown that: 1) The
threshold k˜ increases; 2) The scope of the fear region, (k˜ − kˆ), extends; 3) The long-
run fear steady state moves closer to the long-run KUJ steady state. So, an increase in τ
would endogenously prolong the presence of the economy in the fear region (see Figure 14),
and at the same time will make the FE more egalitarian since the erosion of institutions
decreases tolerance for inequality and exacerbates the fear constraint. This may explain
the persistence of the fear equilibrium, along with such characteristics as poorly protected
private property rights, fear of envy, and relatively low inequality.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a unified framework for the economic analysis of envy by capturing its
two main forces, destructive and competitive. The active side of envy is determined jointly
by the level of and tolerance for inequality, which depends endogenously on the degree of
property rights protection and the strength of relative concerns.
Competitive envy gives rise to the standard “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ)
equilibrium characterized by suboptimally high effort and consumption due to positional
externality. This equilibrium roughly corresponds to the evidence from modern industri-
alized economies, in which emulation is the main driver of consumer demand. On the
other hand, low tolerance for inequality may lead to qualitatively different equilibria, in
which the destructive side of envy is predominant. In the “fear equilibrium” the better
endowed agents constrain their effort to prevent destructive envy of the relatively poor.
This equilibrium resembles the features of pre-industrial societies documented by anthro-
pologists, and some characteristics of socialist and transition economies, where political
ideology coupled with poor protection of property rights were instrumental in decreasing
tolerance for inequality and fostering the fear of envy.
The different nature of these equilibria yields contrasting comparative statics with re-
spect to envy. In the KUJ equilibrium, envy enhances production by intensifying emulation,
while in the fear equilibrium it reduces output by aggravating the fear constraint.
The basic model is applied to examine the interplay between institutions, welfare, and
economic performance. In Section 4 it is shown how the possibility of voluntary transfer
can mitigate destruction in equilibrium, which is in line with the evidence on the role of
redistributive mechanisms. In Section 5 a comparative welfare analysis of the fear and KUJ
equilibria is conducted. Despite the fact that KUJ equilibrium always yields higher outputs
than the fear equilibrium, it may be Pareto inferior. In particular, consumption externality
that causes inefficiency of the KUJ equilibrium is partially curbed in the fear equilibrium,
which implies that adopting better property rights protection may not represent a Pareto
improvement in the presence of positional externalities.
Finally, the static model is augmented with dynamic linkages to explore the evolution
of the economy through different envy regimes. Starting at any initial condition, the econ-
omy converges to the long-run KUJ steady state and inequality monotonically decreases
along the transition path. The dynamic model highlights the changing role of envy in the
transition process and permits to analyze the role of institutions and culture with regard
to envy. Factors that decrease tolerance for inequality prolong the presence in the fear
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region and delay transition to the KUJ steady state. Moreover, individuals may choose to
stay longer in the fear region by voluntarily refusing to adopt better institutions. This may
explain the persistence of poor property rights protection, the fear of envy and relatively
low inequality in simple societies as well as countries with long socialist experience.
A promising direction for future research would be to incorporate the present theory
of envy in a more sophisticated growth model which would allow to explore the feedback
mechanisms between technology, institutions, inequality, and the two sides of envy.
Overall, the proposed framework offers a parsimonious way to account for envy in the
economic analysis of institutions, development, and culture, and bridges the gap between
separate lines of theoretical and empirical research on envy in social sciences.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Agent 2 is solving (9) subject to (7) and (8). Consider first the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1, in which
U2 =
(Y2 − θY1)1−σ
1− σ −
Y2
K2
.
It is strictly concave in Y2, and the first-order conditions yield the following optimum:
Y2 =
{
K
1/σ
2 + θY1, if Y1 > C˜1;
Y1 · 1τθ , if Y1 < C˜1,
(A1)
where C˜1 is defined in Lemma 1. That is, the left derivative of U2 at point Y2 = Y1/τθ is positive (negative) iff Y1 < C˜1
(Y1 > C˜1). Next, consider the destructive case, τθY2 > Y1, in which
U2 =
1
1− σ ·
(√
Y1Y2
τθ
· (1 + θ2)− θ(τ + 1)
τ
Y1
)1−σ
− Y2
K2
.
Again, U2 is concave in Y2, and the interior optimum is uniquely defined by the first-order condition:
(√
Y1Y2
τθ
· (1 + θ2)− θ(τ + 1)
τ
Y1
)−σ
·
(
1 + θ2
2
√
τθ
·
√
Y1
Y2
)
− 1
K2
= 0. (A2)
It follows that the right derivative of U2 at point Y2 = Y1/τθ is positive (negative) iff Y1 < Ĉ1 (Y1 > Ĉ1), where Ĉ1 is defined
in Lemma 1 and Ĉ1 < C˜1, since 0 < θ < 1. Hence, allowing destruction is the best response iff Y1 < Ĉ1.
To rewrite (A2) in terms of consumption note that under destruction

C1 = (1− d∗)Y1 = 1 + τ
τ
Y1 −
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2;
C2 = p
∗Y2 =
√
Y1Y2
τθ
.
=⇒

Y1 =
1 + τ
τ
(C1 + θC2);
Y2 = θ(1 + τ) · C
2
2
C1 + θC2
.
(A3)
Substituting this into (A2) yields (11). Next, applying the implicit function theorem to (11) gives
dC2
dC1
=
θ + 1
σ
· C2−θC1
C1+θC2
1 + 1
σ
· C2−θC1
C1+θC2
· C1
C2
> 0
since in equilibrium C2 > θC1. It is also straightforward to show that dC2/dC1 < C2/C1. Finally,
d2C2
dC21
=
(
σ +
C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
· C1
C2
)−1
·
C2 − C1 · dC2dC1
C2(C1 + θC2)
·
 (1 + θ2)
(
C1
dC2
dC1
− C2
)
C1 + θC2
−
dC2
dC1
(C2 − θC1)
C2
 < 0,
since C2 > θC1 and 0 < dC2/dC1 < C2/C1. Hence, Cd2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof of Lemma 2. Agent 1 is solving (12) subject to (7) and (8). In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1,
U1 =
(Y1 − θY2)1−σ
1− σ −
Y1
K1
.
It is strictly concave in Y1, and the first-order conditions yield the following optimum:
Y1 =
{
K
1/σ
1 + θY2, if Y2 6 Ĉ2;
τθY2, if Y2 > Ĉ2,
(A4)
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where Ĉ2 is defined in Lemma 2. In the destructive case, τθY2 > Y1,
U1 =
1
1− σ ·
(
1 + τ
τ
Y1 − 2
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2
)1−σ
− Y1
K1
.
Assumption σ > 1 is sufficient for U1 to be concave in Y1. In particular, it can be shown by simple differentiation that the
sign of ∂2U1/∂Y 21 is the same as the sign of f(x) ≡ −(1+σ)x2+ξ(2σ+1/2)x−σξ2, where x ≡
√
θY2/τY1 and ξ ≡ (τ+1)/τ .
Then, it is easy to show that fmax ∝ 1− 8σ and so, U1 is concave if σ > 1/8.
Note that U1 is differentiable at point Y1 = τθY2 with u′1(τθY2) = ((τ − 1)θY2)−σ − 1/K1. Next, consider two cases. If
Y2 6 Ĉ2, there is an interior optimum in the KUJ region and concavity of U1 ensures that it is a global optimum. If Y2 > Ĉ2,
there is a unique optimum in the destructive region given by the following first-order condition:
(
1 + τ
τ
Y1 − 2
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2
)−σ
·
(
1 + τ
τ
−
√
θ
τ
· Y2
Y1
)
− 1
K1
= 0. (A5)
Finally, using (A3) rewrite equation (A5) in terms of consumption levels to get 14. Application of the implicit function
theorem to (14) gives
dC1
dC2
=
θ − θ
σ
· C1−θC2
C1+θC2
1− θ
σ
· C1−θC2
C1+θC2
· C2
C1
> 0,
since σ > 1 and in equilibrium C1 > θC2. It is also straightforward to show that dC1/dC2 < C1/C2. Finally,
d2C1
dC22
=
θ
σ
(
1− θ
σ
· C1 − θC2
C1 + θC2
· C2
C1
)−1  θ
(
dC1
dC2
· C2
C1
− 1
)2
C1 + θC2
+
(C1 − θC2)
(
dC1
dC2
+ θ
)(
1− dC1
dC2
· C2
C1
)
(C1 + θC2)2
 > 0,
which proves convexity.
Proof of Proposition 1. Private outputs in the KUJ equilibrium are given by (15). For this to be an equilibrium
two conditions must hold: Y KUJ1 > C˜1 and Y KUJ2 6 Ĉ2. This yields k > k˜, where k˜ is defined in Proposition 1. In the fear
equilibrium private outputs are given by (16). For Y F2 to fall in the fear region it must be the case that Ĉ1 6 Y F1 < C˜1, which
yields kˆ 6 k < k˜ with kˆ defined in Proposition 1. Finally for k < kˆ the equilibrium is given by (17). To prove its existence
and uniqueness note that, from Lemma 1, Cd2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave and, from Lemma 2, C
d
1 (C2) is strictly
increasing and convex. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that Ĉ1 > Cd1 (Ĉ1/τθ). Then, the intermediate value theorem
guarantees existence, and the properties of best response functions imply uniqueness. In particular, direct comparison shows
that the slope of BR1 is always steeper than that of BR2, which ensures single crossing.
Proof of Proposition 2. Results for KUJE and FE follow directly from differentiation of (15) and (16). For DE,
consider the system defining the equilibrium: f1 ≡ C1 − θC2 − ψ[C1/(C1 + θC2)]
1/σ = 0;
f2 ≡ C2 − θC1 − φ[(C1 + θC2)/C2]1/σ = 0.
Using the equilibrium conditions, it can be shown that
[DCf ]
−1 =
1
∆
[
1 + 1
σ
· C2−θC1
C1+θC2
· C1
C2
θ − θ
σ
· C1−θC2
C1+θC2
θ + 1
σ
· C2−θC1
C1+θC2
1− θ
σ
· C1−θC2
C1+θC2
· C2
C1
]
,
where C is the vector of consumption levels, f is the vector of f1 and f2, and ∆ ≡ det(DCf) = 1− θ2 + [(C1 − θC2)2(C2 −
θC1)]/[σ(C1 + θC2)C1C2] > 0. It follows from this expression that all elements of [DCf ]
−1 are positive if σ > 1.
For part (a), note that, by the implicit function theorem, DλC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dλf and
Dλf = −
[
ψλ
ψ
(C1 − θC2)
φλ
φ
(C2 − θC1)
]
=
1
σ
[
− 1
λ
(C1 − θC2)
1
1−λ (C2 − θC1)
]
.
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It follows that
∂C1
∂λ
∝
[
1 +
1
σ
C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
C1
C2
]
(C1 − θC2)− θλ
1− λ
[
1− 1
σ
C1 − θC2
C1 + θC2
]
(C2 − θC1).
Dividing (11) by (14) and denoting x ≡ C1/C2 ∈ (θ, 1), in equilibrium we have
λ
1− λ =
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ
· τ(1 + θ
2)
2θ(1 + τ)2
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
Plugging this expression in the previous equation and making transformations, we get that the sign of ∂C1/∂λ is determined
by
σ(θ + x) + x(1− θx)
σ(θ + x)− (x− θ) −
τ(1 + θ2)
2(1 + τ)2
·
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ−1
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
The first term is always greater than 1. The second term is increasing in x and at x = 1 simplifies to τ(1+θ2)(1+θ)2/[2(1+τ)2].
The latter expression is maximized at τ = 1 in which case it is equal to (1 + θ2)(1 + θ)2/4 6 1 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the second
term is always less than 1 and ∂C1/∂λ > 0.
Similarly, the sign of the effect of λ on total consumption, ∂C/∂λ, coincides with the sign of
σ(1 + θ)(x+ θ) + (1− θx)(1 + x)
σ(1 + θ)(x+ θ)− θ(x− θ)(1 + 1/x) −
τ(1 + θ2)
2(1 + τ)2
·
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ−1
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
As above, the first term is always greater than 1, while the second is always less than 1. Hence, ∂C/∂λ > 0.
For part (b), note that DθC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dθf and
Dθf = −
 C2 · ( 1σ · C1−θC2C1+θC2 − 1)
−C1 + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2 ·
(1−θ2)C1−2θ3C2
θ(1+θ2)
 .
It follows that the sign of ∂C1/∂θ is determined by the sign of
C2 + θC1 − 1
σ
C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
(
(1− θ2)C1 − 2θ3C2
1 + θ2
− C1
)
.
Since (1− θ2)C1 − 2θ3C2 − (1 + θ2)C1 = −2θ2C1 − 2θ3C2 < 0, we get ∂C1/∂θ > 0.
For part (c), note that DτC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dτf and
Dτf = −
[
ψτ
ψ
(C1 − θC2)
φτ
φ
(C2 − θC1)
]
with both elements positive, since ψτ < 0 and φτ < 0. It follows that the elements of DτC are negative meaning that C1
and C2 are decreasing in τ .
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (7), rewrite (21) as
v
(
(1 + θ2)
√
(Y1 + T )(Y2 − T )
τθ
− θ(τ + 1)
τ
(Y1 + T )
)
−→ max
T
s.t. 0 6 T 6 T¯ .
The objective function is concave in T . The first-order condition for interior solution, T ∗, is
1 + θ2
2
√
τθ
· Y2 − Y1 − 2T
∗√
(Y1 + T ∗)(Y2 − T ∗)
=
θ(τ + 1)
τ
, 0 < T ∗ < T¯ .
It is straightforward to check that v′(T¯ ) > 0 iff τθ 6 (1 − θ)/(1 + θ) which is the condition for full transfer. On the other
hand, v′(0) < 0 iff a(1 − x2) < bx, where x ≡ √Y1/Y2, a ≡ (1 + θ2)/2√τθ and b ≡ θ(τ + 1)/τ . Solving this inequality
yields the condition Y1/Y2 > µ, where √µ ≡ [
√
τ2(1 + θ2)2 + θ2(τ + 1)2τθ − θ(τ + 1)√τθ]/[τ(1 + θ2)], and 0 < µ 6 τθ if
τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ).
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Proof of Lemma 4. In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1, as established in the proof of Lemma 1, the optimal action of Agent
2 is (A1). In the case with full transfer the utility of Agent 2 is
U2 =
γ2(Y1 + Y2)1−σ
1− σ −
Y2
K2
,
where γ2 is defined in Lemma 4. It is concave in Y2 and the unique optimum is given by Y2 = (γ2K2)1/σ − Y1, which is
interior iff Y1 < Y˘1, where Y˘1 is defined in Lemma 4, and Y˘1 < Y˜1, as direct comparison shows. Putting this together yields
(22).
Proof of Lemma 5. In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1, as established in the proof of Lemma 2, the optimal action of Agent
1 is (A4). Now consider the case in which Agent 2 makes a full transfer under a credible threat of destruction, τθY2 > Y1.
The utility of Agent 1 is
U1 =
γ1(Y1 + Y2)1−σ
1− σ −
Y1
K1
,
where γ1 is defined in Lemma 5. This yields the following solution:
Y1 =

b1 ≡ τθY2, if Y2 < (γ1K1)1/σ/(1 + τθ);
b2 ≡ (γ1K1)1/σ − Y2, if (γ1K1)1/σ/(1 + τθ) 6 Y2 < Y˘2;
b3 ≡ 0, if Y2 > Y˘2,
(A6)
where Y˘2 is defined in Lemma 5. First, note that if the optimum is not interior in the KUJ region, that is, if Y2 > Ĉ2,
the global optimum is determined by (A6) since in this case the left derivative of U1 at point Y1 = τθY2 is less than the
(negative) right derivative. Consider for simplicity only the case Y˘2 < Ĉ2 (the other case can be analyzed in exactly the same
way) which holds if
σ < σ¯ ≡ ln[(1 + τθ)/(θ(τ − 1))]
ln(1 + τθ)
. (A7)
Then, as follows from (A6), Y2 > Ĉ2 implies that the best response will be b3. If, however, Y2 < Ĉ2, the optimum in the
KUJ region is interior and needs to be compared to the best response in the transfer region. The utility generated by the
former is
U2KUJ =
σ
1− σK
1−σ
σ
1 −
θY2
K1
.
If Y˘2 6 Y2 < Ĉ2, b3 is the best response in the transfer region and the corresponding utility is
U2FT = γ2 ·
Y 1−σ2
1− σ .
Then, it is easy to show that U2FT > U
2
KUJ in the region Y˘2 6 Y2 < Ĉ2 if the following restriction holds:
[
1
1− σ + θ
]
·
[
θ(τ − 1)
1 + τθ
] 1−σ
σ
>
σ
1− σ . (A8)
Assume that it holds. Then, consider the region (γ1K1)1/σ/(1 + τθ) 6 Y2 < Y˘2, in which b2 is the best response in the case
with transfer and the corresponding utility is
U2FT =
σ
1− σ γ
1/σ
1 K
1−σ
σ
1 +
Y2
K1
.
Since (A8) holds and KUJ optimum is interior (that is, b1 cannot be a best response) it must be the case that in this region
there exists a value of Y2 such that U2FT = U
2
KUJ. Direct computation shows that this value is Y˜2 as defined in Lemma 5.
So, if Y2 6 Y˜2, KUJ best response is the global optimum; otherwise, it is b2.
Proof of Proposition 3. For (15) to be an equilibrium, as follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, the following
conditions must hold: Y KUJ1 > Y˜1 and Y KUJ2 6 Y˜2. This yields the condition k > max{(γ2/γ1)σ/(σ−1), ω}. If the best
responses intersect in their transfer regions, we get outputs as in (24). For it to be an equilibrium it must be the case that
Y FT1 6 Y˘1 and Y FT2 > Y˘2 which yields the condition k 6 γ2/γ1. To get the partitioning in Proposition 3 observe that under
37
assumptions of Section 4 the following is true: (γ2/γ1)σ/(σ−1) < ω < γ2/γ1. From direct comparison and re-arrangement of
terms, the former part of this inequality holds iff [(1+τθ)/(θ(τ−1))]α < 1+[α(1+θ)]/[θ(τ−1)], where α ≡ (σ−1)/σ ∈ (0, 1).
This is always true since the left-hand side is a convex function of α for 0 < α < 1 and at α = 0 and α = 1 both sides of the
inequality coincide. Similarly, ω < γ2/γ1 iff
α
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]α
< (1− θ)
([
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]α
− 1
)
− αθ.
It is straightforward to show that both sides of this inequality are strictly increasing, convex functions that coincide at
α = 0 and α = 1. Moreover, the derivative of the right-hand side exceeds that of the left-hand side at α = 0 iff ln([1 +
τθ]/[θ(τ − 1)]) > θ/(1 − θ). This is true since 1 < τ < (1 − θ)/[θ(1 + θ)]. Note that the latter inequality also implies that
σ(1− θ)(1− γ1/σ1 )/(1− σ) > θ, that is, ω is well-defined.
Finally, it can be shown that the fear equilibrium without transfers (as in the basic model) does not exist. For (16) to be
an equilibrium, condition Y F2 = Cˆ2 6 Y˜2 must be satisfied, but restriction (A7) rules this out since Y˜2 < Y˘2 < Cˆ2. Putting
everything together yields the statement of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows from (15) and (24) that
CKUJ1
CKUJ2
=
k1/σ + θ
1 + θk1/σ
,
CFT1
CFT2
= τθ.
Then, inequality is higher in FT equilibrium iff k > [(1 − τθ2)/θ(τ − 1)]−σ , and it is sufficient to show that ω > [(1 −
τθ2)/θ(τ − 1)]−σ to prove part 1. The latter holds iff [(1 + θ)/θ(τ − 1)] > [σ(1 − γ1/σ1 )/(1 − σ)]. Denote the right-hand
side of this inequality as f(α), where α ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). Then, it is straightforward to show that f ′(α) > 0 and
limα→1 f(α) = [(1 + θ)/θ(τ − 1)], which completes the proof of part 1.
It follows from (15) and (24) that Y KUJ > Y FT2 iff (k
1/σ + 1)/(1− θ) > γ1/σ2 . Since k > ω,
k1/σ + 1
1− θ >
ω1/σ + 1
1− θ =
1− σγ1/σ1
σ(1− γ1/σ1 )− θ(1− σγ1/σ1 )
.
This expression exceeds γ
1/σ
2 iff 1 − θ < (σ − 1)/(σγ1/σ1 − 1). Denote the right-hand side of the inequality as g(σ). Then,
g′(σ) < 0 and limσ→∞ g(σ) = 1− θ, which completes the proof of part 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. The utilities of individuals in FE are given by (26). In KUJE, as follows from (15), they are
U iKUJ =
[
1
1− σ −
1
1− θ2
]
·K
1−σ
σ
i −
θ
1− θ2 ·
K
1
σ
j
Ki
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
For Agent 1, U1KUJ > U
1
F iff k > [θ(τ − 1)/(1− τθ2)]σ which is, as shown in Proposition 1, the threshold for KUJE vs. FE.
This implies that Agent 1 always prefers staying in FE. For Agent 2, U2KUJ > U
2
F iff
[
1
1− σ −
1
1− θ2
]
·
(
K2
K1
) 1
σ
+
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)(1− θ2) >
1
1− σ ·
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]1−σ
· K2
K1
. (A9)
Let L(x) and R(x) denote the left and right-hand sides of (A9), respectively, where x ≡ K2/K1. Then, L(1/k˜) = R(1/k˜) and
f(θ) ≡ L(1/kˆ)−R(1/kˆ) ∝ 1
1− σ ·
[(
2
1 + θ2
)1/σ
− 2
1 + θ2
]
− 1
1− θ2 ·
[(
2
1 + θ2
)1/σ
− 1
]
.
Consider first the case σ > 1, in which L′(x) < 0 and L′′(x) > 0. It can be shown that ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that L(1/kˆ) −
R(1/kˆ) > 0 iff θ < θ¯. Let z ≡ 2/(1 + θ2) ∈ (1, 2), and γ ≡ 1/σ ∈ (0, 1). Next, define g(z) ≡ 2(z − 1)f(z) = [2γ/(γ −
1)] · (z1+γ − zγ − z2 + z) − (z1+γ − z). It is clear that f(θ) has a unique root θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) iff g(z) has a unique root
z¯ ∈ (1, 2) apart from z = 1. To prove the latter notice that: 1) g(1) = 0, g(2) ∝ 1 + γ − 2γ > 0; 2) g′(1) = −γ < 0; 3)
g′′(z) = 4/(1 − γ) − [(1 + γ)2/(1 − γ)]zγ−1 − 2γzγ−2 > 4/(1 − γ) − (1 + γ)2/(1 − γ) − 2γ = 3 − γ > 0. It can be shown
similarly that Proposition 5 also holds for 0 < σ < 1.
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Proof of Lemma 7. The functional forms of gi(kt), i = 1, 2, follow directly from (15), (16), and (29). The form of
g3(kt) follows from (11), (14) and (29). Next, it is straightforward to establish by differentiation that g1(k) and g2(k) are
strictly increasing and concave, given that β < 1 and σ(1−β) > 1. Also, g1(1) = 1, g1(k˜) = g2(k˜) > k˜, and g2(k¯) = g3(k¯) > k¯.
The two last properties follow from assumptions that θ < 1, τθ < 1, σ > 1 and β < 1. Together this implies that kt+1 > kt
for kt > kˆ. Finally, if there exists a steady state k¯ in the destructive segment, it is given by g3(k¯) = k¯. Making a substitution
κ = k¯1−β and rearranging terms yields the equation defining the steady state:
κ2−β
(κ+ θ)2(1−β)
= pi
(
κ− θ
1− θκ
)σ(1−β)
, (A10)
where pi ≡ [τ(1 + θ2)/2θ(1 + τ)2]1−β and in equilibrium κ > θ. It is easy to show that R(κ), the right-hand side of (A10), is
strictly increasing and convex. Also, L(κ), the left-hand side of (A10), is strictly increasing. To show that it is concave for
κ > θ, note that the sign of L′′(κ) is determined by the sign of L˜ ≡ (κ+ θ)(2− β)(βκ+ θ(1− β))− κ(3− 2β)(βκ+ θ(2− β)).
At κ = θ this expression is negative, since β < 1. Moreover, it is strictly decreasing for the same reason. Hence, L′′(κ) < 0
for κ > θ. This implies that there exists at most one solution to (A10). If there is no solution, the proof is finished. Assume
now that k¯ exists. In this case k¯ > kˆ. To see this, note first that kˆ < (τθ)1/(1−β). Next, κ > τθ since L(τθ) > R(τθ). Hence,
k¯ ≡ κ1/(1−β) > (τθ)1/(1−β) > kˆ, i.e., kt+1 > kt for 0 < kt < kˆ.
Proof of Lemma 8. It follows from the properties of g1(kt) that kt monotonically converges to 1 in the KUJ region. The
expression for ∆Ki = 0 comes from (30) and may be rewritten as Kjt = Kit[(ρK
1−β−1/σ
it − 1)/θ]σ , where ρ ≡ (1 − θ2)/α.
Then, by differentiation we get that dKjt/dKit > 0 and d
2Kjt/dK
2
it > 0, since σ(1 − β) > 1. This implies the stated
properties of the ∆Ki = 0 loci. The expression for K¯ follows from solving ∆K1 = ∆K2 = 0 and (15) then gives Y¯ .
Proof of Lemma 9. The equations for ∆Ki = 0 come from (30). Since in the fear region K1t+1 = ατK
1/σ+β
1t /(τ − 1)
and σ(1 − β) > 1, K1t converges to K¯1. Plugging this in ∆K2 = 0 yields K¯2. The output levels follow from (16). To see
that the long-run fear equilibrium is in the KUJ region, note that the implied steady-state level of inequality is (τθ)1/(1−β)
which exceeds k˜ = [θ(τ − 1)/(1− τθ2)]σ , since σ(1− β) > 1 and [θ(τ − 1)/(1− τθ2)] < τθ < 1.
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